Child refugees may no longer sponsor siblings

The International Protection Act 2026 will almost certainly lead to litigation, the Irish Centre for European Law (ICEL) annual asylum and immigration law conference has heard.

Introduced by ICEL executive director Michelle Drury BL, the event was held at the Richmond Education and Event Centre in Dublin 7, and online (26 June).

Catherine Cosgrave (managing solicitor at Immigrant Council of Ireland) examined the act’s changes to family reunification.

She noted that, for protection beneficiaries, family life has been "involuntarily ruptured" because of international-protection needs, and the arrival of family members was often "the only means by which family life can resume".

While Ireland was not bound by the Family Reunification Directive, aspects of family reunification nevertheless engaged EU law, Cosgrave said.

She referred to domestic jurisprudence, including SH and AJ v Minister for Justice, concerning damages arising from breaches of EU law.

Cosgrave highlighted key differences between the 2026 act and the International Protection Act 2015.

Sections 204 and 205 distinguish between family members already present in the State and those seeking admission from abroad.

Self-sufficiency requirements

Most notably, applicants are now prohibited from applying for family reunification until two years after receiving international protection, and must satisfy financial, accommodation, and self-sufficiency requirements.

Although section 206 provides that the minister may waive those requirements for unaccompanied children, Cosgrave noted that the power was entirely discretionary and that no guidance had yet been published explaining how the discretion would be exercised.

She also highlighted changes to the definition of eligible family members.

While the act expands eligibility for adult sponsors to include civil partners, dependant adult children and dependant parents, it removes the previous entitlement of child refugees to sponsor their minor siblings by permitting applications only for their parents, which Cosgrave described as a "very, very significant change".

Prohibition on reliance upon HAP

Cosgrave suggested that the combined effect of the income thresholds, accommodation criteria and prohibition on reliance upon Housing Assistance Payments (HAP), would mean that many applicants would be unable to satisfy the eligibility conditions even after the mandatory two-year waiting period.

She questioned how recently recognised refugees, particularly former unaccompanied minors, could realistically meet those requirements.

Cosgrave also flagged the absence of transitional arrangements: "So if you got your protection decision on 11 June prior to the act commencing on 12 June, you have to re-apply under the 2026 act.”

Mentioning the Qualification Regulation, the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Family Reunification Directive, Cosgrave argued that the provisions raised broader questions about the harmonisation of refugee rights across member states.

Prolonged separation

She suggested that the mandatory two-year waiting period, coupled with lengthy administrative processing times, could result in prolonged separation of refugee families and observed that the legislation and accompanying regulations may place Ireland "as a complete outlier in the EU".

She concluded by predicting that the reforms were likely to give rise to litigation.

Stephen Collins (senior solicitor at the Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission) assessed whether the act represented a diminution of rights compared to the previous system, the pact and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.

The vice-chair of the Law Society's Human Rights and Equality Committee focused on provisions affecting children and other applicants with special reception needs as a "litmus test".

On detention, Collins outlined article 13(1) of the Reception Conditions Directive, which provides that applicants with special reception needs "shall not be detained" where detention would place their physical or mental health at serious risk.

He also referred to article 13(2), under which "minors shall, as a rule, not be detained", subject to limited exceptional circumstances reflected in section 119 of the act.

Suspected trafficking

Referencing Minister of State Colm Brophy's Seanad statement that detention of children would arise only in a very limited set of circumstances – including where it was in the child's best interests – Collins said this could be of "great benefit" in cases such as suspected trafficking.

However, Collins noted that section 120 created new offences that lead to arrest and detention before vulnerability assessments are completed.

Because section 122 confined the prohibition on detention to arrests under section 118, he argued, the act "appears to permit the arrest and detention of applicants with special reception needs" under section 120, even where detention may place their physical or mental health at serious risk, contrary to article 13(1) of the RCD.

On transfer procedures, Collins cited sections 145 and 230, permitting detention for up to five and 12 weeks, respectively.

While both exclude minors, that protection is disapplied where an officer has "reasonable grounds" for believing the person is over 18.

Prescribed places of detention include garda stations and prisons, which Collins contrasted with article 13(2) of the Reception Conditions Directive, providing that minors "shall never be detained in prison or another facility used for law enforcement purposes".

Age assessment

On age assessment, Collins said the State "had a choice about whether it wanted to do medical examinations, and the State has chosen to do medical examinations".

He noted that article 25 of the Asylum Procedures Regulation required member states to presume an applicant was a minor where doubt remained after assessment and that examinations be carried out by qualified professionals.

Section 57 of the act, however, permits examinations by a wider category of ‘designated healthcare professionals’ – including psychologists, social workers and any other profession that the minister prescribes.

Section 60 allows Tusla to initiate a further age assessment where it has ‘reasonable grounds’ to believe a person previously determined to be a minor is not under 18.

Collins questioned whether repeated medical assessments could be conducted consistently with the requirement that a child's dignity be respected under both the act and article 1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.