Court backs marriage right of cognitively impaired

In a groundbreaking judgment, Judge Geoffrey Shannon of the Circuit Court  (pictured) issued the first decision in Irish law to define the standard for assessing capacity to marry under the Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Act 2015.

The judge described the case as “narrow in scope but significant in consequence”.

The Circuit Court ruling (4 November), is significant both legally and socially, lawyer Emma Meagher of Eversheds Sutherland has written.

The ruling affirmed that individuals with cognitive impairments were entitled not only to protection, but also to empowerment, particularly in the exercise of fundamental rights.

The case concerned AB, an adult with an intellectual disability who has lived in a residential centre since the death of his parents.

The applicant, the residential centre, sought a declaration under section 37(1)(b) of the 2015 act that AB lacked capacity to enter into marriage.

For more than 20 years, AB has been in a committed relationship with CD, who also has an intellectual disability but lives independently with supports. The couple have long expressed a sincere wish to marry.

For years, an interim High Court injunction prevented AB from participating in any marriage ceremony. Although that order was eventually vacated, it remained stayed pending the outcome of this unprecedented capacity application, lawyer Emma Meagher explained.

Ability to understand

The residential centre argued that AB lacked the ability to understand the nature of marriage and the responsibilities that accompany it, even under the low threshold traditionally applied.

It submitted that AB did not appreciate the potential legal and financial consequences of marriage or divorce and questioned whether his consent was genuinely free and independent. Two expert witnesses supported the applicant’s position, concluding that AB lacked capacity to marry.

The applicant maintained that while it supported the couple’s long-standing relationship, it also had a statutory duty to ensure that any marriage entered into by AB was based on informed consent.

AB, through counsel Declan Higgins BL, strongly opposed the application, arguing that it interfered with his constitutionally protected right to marry.

He contended that the expert assessments imposed an unrealistically high standard and failed to reflect the low threshold Irish and British jurisprudence traditionally applies to capacity to marry.

His legal team criticised the assessments as incomplete, insufficiently supported, and inconsistent with the requirements of the 2015 act and the Decision Support Service Code of Practice.

They stressed that AB viewed marriage as deeply meaningful and saw no reason why he should be treated differently from others wishing to marry.

Counsel for the notice party, Emma Slattery BL, argued that the applicant had misapplied the legal test and relied on expert assessments that failed to follow a rights-based, supportive process. She emphasised that the experts’ approach was overly abstract and did not reflect the functional, decision-specific standard required by the 2015 act.

She noted that the couple’s relationship had endured for more than two decades and criticised the reliance on brief clinical encounters, rather than a holistic understanding of AB’s life, capabilities, and consistent will and preference to marry.

Profound implications

Judge Shannon acknowledged the profound implications of the case, and examined the 2015 act, constitutional protections, ECHR rights, British jurisprudence, and, the voices and wishes of both AB and CD.

The court drew heavily on England-and-Wales case law, particularly Sheffield City Council v. E (2004), which emphasises that the capacity to marry requires only a basic, ‘rudimentary’ understanding of the marriage contract.

Judge Shannon warned that imposing too high a threshold would risk excluding individuals with intellectual disabilities from the institution of marriage, contrary to constitutional and human-rights protections.

Standalone test for capacity to marry

Because Irish law had never articulated a standalone test for capacity to marry, the court set out a new four-part standard:

• Understanding nature of marriage – basic appreciation that marriage is a legally binding union that changes one’s civil status,
• Appreciating duties and responsibilities – broad awareness of mutual obligations such as support, companionship, and shared decision-making,
• Recognising potential consequences – general understanding that marriage may involve legal or financial consequences,
• Providing free, informed consent – decision must be voluntary, without coercion or undue influence.

Judge Shannon stressed that this threshold was intentionally low, reflecting constitutional commitments to autonomy and dignity.

Findings 

The court found that the presumption of capacity under section 8(2) of the 2015 act had not been rebutted.

It held that the expert assessments did not comply with statutory requirements: they did not provide relevant information up front, did not employ supports to help AB understand marriage, and did not involve iterative or educative engagement.

The court concluded there was no evidence of coercion or undue influence. Instead, AB’s consistent, long-term wish to marry showed genuine and freely expressed preference.

Judge Shannon said that the 2015 act “is not merely a procedural reform. It is a statement of values which affirms that individuals with cognitive impairments are entitled to support, respect, and the presumption of capacity”.

Accordingly, the court declined to declare that AB lacked capacity to marry.

Landmark decision

This was the first Irish judgment to articulate a capacity-to-marry test, setting a significant precedent for future cases involving autonomy, disability rights, and personal relationships, Emma Meagher of Evershed Sutherland said.

The ruling underscores that proving incapacity carries a high burden and that assessments must follow a rights-based, supportive, and structured approach.

Ultimately, the court reaffirmed that the law must both protect and empower—and that individuals with cognitive impairments retain the right to love, commitment, and marriage on equal terms.